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Abstract: This paper considers a model of the world economy with a finite 
number of ex-ante identical countries and a continuum of tradeable goods. 
Productivity differences across countries arise endogenously through free entry to 
the local differentiated producer service sector in each country.  It is shown that, 
in any stable equilibrium, the countries sort themselves into specializing in 
different sets of tradeable goods and that a strict ranking of countries in income, 
TFP, and the capital-labor ratio emerge endogenously. The equilibrium Lorenz 
curve is characterized by a second-order nonlinear difference equation with the 
two terminal conditions.  As the number of countries increases, this equation 
converges to a differential equation whose unique solution can be solved 
analytically and depends on a few parameters in a tractable manner.  This enables 
us to show when the equilibrium distribution obeys a power-law and how various 
forms of globalization affect inequality among countries and to study the welfare 
effects of trade. 
 
Keywords: Endogenous Comparative Advantage, Endogenous Inequality, 
Globalization and Inequality; Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson model; Dixit-Stiglitz 
model of monopolistic competition, Symmetry-Breaking, Lorenz-dominant shifts, 
Log-submodularity; Power-law distributions 
 
                                                 
1 Some of the results here have previously been circulated as a memo entitled “Emergent International Economic 
Order.”  I would like to thanks the participants at Hitotsubashi COE Conference on International Trade and FDI 
2009 and Workshop on Economic Growth and Regional Dynamics at Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto 
University, for their valuable comments. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
  - 1 -
1. Introduction 
This paper considers a model of the world economy with a finite number of countries that 
are (ex-ante) identical.  There is a single composite of primary factors and a continuum of 
tradeable consumption goods, as in the Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 
(1977).  Unlike their model, however, productivity of tradeable goods sectors in each country is 
endogenous and depends on the available variety of local differentiated producer services, which 
is determined by free entry to the local service sector, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of 
monopolistic competition.  The key assumption is that tradeable goods sectors differ in their 
dependence on local differentiated services.  This creates a two-way (i.e., reciprocal) causality 
between patterns of trade and productivity differences.  Having more variety of local services 
gives a country comparative advantage in tradeable sectors that are more dependent on those 
services.  This in turn means a larger market for those services, hence more firms enter to 
provide such services.  As a result, the country ends up having more variety of local services. 
Due to such a circular (or positive feedback) mechanism, any stable equilibrium of the 
model has the following features.  First, different countries sort themselves into specializing in 
different sets of tradeable goods (endogenous comparative advantage).  Second, no two 
countries share the same level of income or TFP.  In other words, a strict ranking of countries in 
income, TFP, and (in an extension of the model that allows for variable factor supply) capital-
labor ratio emerges endogenously.  Third, although the model is silent about the ranking of each 
country (because they are ex-ante identical), it generates a unique distribution across countries 
(at least with a sufficiently large number of countries). 
More specifically, the equilibrium Lorenz curve is fully characterized by a second-order 
nonlinear difference equation with two terminal conditions.  This equation is not analytically 
solvable.  However, as the number of countries increases, this equation converges to a 
differential equation with a unique solution, which can be solved analytically and depends on a 
few parameters in a tractable way.  This enables us to study, among other things, when cross-
country distribution in income and TFP obeys the power-law and how various forms of 
globalization affect inequality across countries, and to study the welfare effects of trade. 
For example, the model has a set of parameters that represent the degree of differentiation 
across services, the fraction of the consumption goods that are tradeable, and the share of 
primary factors of production whose supply can respond to TFP through either factor mobility or ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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factor accumulation.  With these parameters entering the solution in log-submodular way, it is 
shown that a change in these parameters causes a Lorenz-dominant shift of the equilibrium 
Lorenz curve.  From this, one could conclude that globalization through trade in goods or trade 
in factors, or skill-biased technological change that increases the share of human capital and 
reduces the share of raw labor, etc., leads to greater inequality among countries.  It is also shown 
that, as the number of countries increases, the sufficient and necessary condition under which all 
countries gain from trade relative to autarky converges to a simple form, which greatly simplifies 
the task of evaluating the welfare effects of trade.  It is also shown that, when this condition fails, 
there exists a set of tradeable goods such that any countries that end up specializing in these 
goods would lose from trade, and that a fraction of the countries that end up specializing in such 
goods can be arbitrarily close to one.  Thus, perhaps surprisingly, it is possible that almost all 
countries may lose from trade, whenever the condition under which some countries lose from 
trade is met. 
Related work: This is a model of symmetry-breaking, a mechanism that generates stable 
asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric environment due to the instability of the symmetric 
equilibrium.  The idea that symmetry-breaking creates equilibrium variations across ex-ante 
identical countries, groups, regions, and time has been pursued before.
2  Indeed, circular 
mechanisms similar to the one used here play a central role in the so-called new economic 
geography, e.g., Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) and Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008), 
as well as in international trade, e.g., Krugman and Venables (1995) and Matsuyama (1996).  
These studies have already shown how inequality among ex-ante identical countries/regions 
arises, but only within highly simplified frameworks, such as two countries/regions and/or two 
tradeable goods.  Such a framework may be too stylized and too qualitative to be taken seriously 
by many empirical researchers working on cross-country variations in income and TFP.  
Furthermore, such a stylized framework often comes with highly artificial features.
3  The present 
model has advantage of allowing for any finite number of countries and generating a unique 
                                                 
2 For a survey on symmetry-breaking in economics, see a New Palgrave entry by Matsuyama (2008), as well as a 
related entry on ‘emergence” by Ioannides (2008). 
3 Take, for example, Matsuyama (1996), a closest precedent to the present paper.  It assumes, for the sake of the 
tractability, two tradeable goods and a continuum of ex-ante identical countries, and shows that there is a continuum 
of equilibrium distributions, all of which have two clusters of countries.  While it achieves the goal of showing how 
inequality arises among ex-ante identical countries, the prediction that there is a continuum of equilibrium 
distributions is an artifact of the assumption that there is a continuum of countries and the prediction of two clusters 
of countries is an artifact of the assumption that there are only two tradeable goods. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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equilibrium distribution with quantitative implications.  In this respect, Jovanovic (1998, 2009) 
are perhaps closest in spirit to this paper.  He shows that the steady state distribution of income 
across (ex-ante) identical countries obeys a power-law in a model where different vintages of 
machines need to be assigned to workers with different levels of human capital, which are 
endogenously chosen by the representative agent in each country.
4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 studies the basic model, which 
assumes that all consumption goods are tradeable and all primary factors are in fixed supply.  
After the key elements of the model are laid out in section 2.1, the unique equilibrium in a 
single-country world, which may be also viewed as an equilibrium in autarky, is derived in 
section 2.2.  Section 2.3 look at the two-country case, and shows that a symmetric pair of 
asymmetric stable equilibriums is shown to emerge via symmetry-breaking.  Section 2.4 
generalizes this to any finite number of countries, by showing endogenous ranking across a finite 
number of countries, and deriving the difference equation that characterizes the distribution.  
Section 2.5 studies the limit case, where the number of countries goes to infinity.  To the best of 
my knowledge, the method used to derive the limit differential equation is new in economics and 
might be of independent interest.  With the unique equilibrium distribution in hand, this section 
looks at power-law examples and shows how log-submodularity helps to prove that a parameter 
change causes a Lorenz-dominant shift.  Section 2.6 conducts the welfare analysis.  Section 3 
offers two extensions of the basic model.  In section 3.1, the fraction of the consumption goods 
are assumed to be nontradeable.  By reducing the fraction, this extension allows us to study the 
effect of globalization through trade in goods.  In section 3.2, one of the primary factors is 
allowed to vary in supply either through factor mobility and factor accumulation.  This extension 
allows us to study the effect of technological change that increases the relative importance of 
human capital in production and of globalization through trade in factors on inequality.  Section 
4 concludes. 
 
2. Basic  Model: 
2.1  Key Elements of the Model 
                                                 
4 More broadly, the paper is also related to other studies, such as Acemolgu and Ventura (2002) and Ventura (2005), 
that point out the need for studying cross-country income differences in a model of the world economy where 
interactions across countries are explicitly spelled out. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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The world consists of J (ex-ante) identical countries, where J is a positive integer.  There 
may be multiple nontradeable primary factors of production, such as capital (K), labor (L), etc., 
but they can be aggregated to a single composite as V = F(K, L, …).  For now, it is assumed that 
these factors are in fixed supply and that the representative consumer of each country is endowed 
with the same quantity of the (composite) primary factor, V.   (Later, one of the component 
factors is allowed to vary in supply across countries endogenously through factor mobility or 
factor accumulation.) 
As in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), the representative consumer has Cobb-
Douglas preferences over a continuum of tradeable consumption goods, indexed by s ∈ [0,1].  





0 )) ( log( ) ( exp β , where U is 
utility, P(s) > 0 the price of good-s, and β(s) > 0 the share of good-s in the expenditure 
satisfying 1 ) (
1
0 = ∫ ds s β .  By denoting the aggregate income by Y, the budget constraint is then 
written as 





0 )) ( log( ) ( exp β . 
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences not only helps to keep the algebra simple but also 
implies that each good is produced somewhere in the world, which plays an important role in the 
ensuing analysis. 
Each tradeable consumption good is produced competitively with constant returns to 
scale technology, using nontradeable inputs.  They are the (composite) primary factor of 
production as well as a composite of differentiated local producer services, aggregated by a 
symmetric CES, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  The primary factor and the composite of local 
producer services are combined with a Cobb-Douglas technology with γ(s) ∈ [0,1] being the 
share of local producer services in sector-s.  The unit cost of production in each tradeable goods 
sector can thus be expressed as 
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where ω is the price of the (composite) primary factor; n the range of differentiated producer 
services available in equilibrium; p(z) the price of a variety z ∈ [0,n].  The parameter, σ > 1, is 
the direct partial elasticity of substitution between every pair of local services.  It turns out to be 
notationally more convenient to define  0 ) 1 /( 1 > − = σ θ , which I shall call the degree of 
differentiation.  What is crucial here is that the tradeable sectors differ in their dependence on the 
differentiated local services, γ(s).  With little loss of generality, γ(s) is assumed to be continuous 
and strictly increasing in s ∈ [0,1]. 
Monopolistic competition prevails in the local services sector.  Each variety is supplied 
by a single firm, which uses T(q) = f +mq units of the primary factor to supply q units so that the 
total cost is ω(f +mq), of which the fixed cost is ωf  and ωm represents the marginal cost.  As is 
well-known, each monopolistically competitive firm would set its price equal to p(z) = (1+θ)ωm 
in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz environment.  This would mean that it might not be clear whether 
the effects of shifting 0 ) 1 /( 1 > − = σ θ  should be attributed to a change in the degree of 
differentiation or a change in the mark-up rate.  To separate these two conceptually, I depart 
from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz specification by introducing a competitive fringe.  That is, once a 
firm pays the fixed cost of supplying a particular variety, any other firms could supply its perfect 
substitute with the marginal cost equal to (1+ν)ωm > ωm without paying any fixed cost, where 
θ ν ≤ < 0 .  The presence of such competitive fringe forces the monopolistically competitive firm 
to charge a limit price,  
(3)  p(z) = (1+ ν)ωm,  where  θ ν ≤ < 0 . 
Note that this pricing rule generalizes the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation, as the latter is 
captured by the special case,  θ ν = .  This generalization is introduced merely to demonstrate that 
the main results are independent of ν, when  θ ν < , so that the effects of θ should be interpreted 
as those of changing the degree of differentiation, not the mark-up rate.
5 
  From (3), the unit cost of production in each tradeable sector, given by (2), is simplified 
to: 
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5 This generalization of the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation to separate the roles of mark-ups and product differentiation 
has been used previously.  See, e.g., Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998) and Acemoglu (2009, Ch.12.4.4). ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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Note that, given ω, a higher n reduces the unit cost of production in all tradeable sectors, which 
is nothing but productivity gains from variety, as discussed by Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987).  
Eq. (4) shows that this effect is stronger for a larger θ, and that higher-indexed sectors gain more 
from such variety effect, which plays an important role in the ensuing analysis. 
  Since all the services are priced equally and enter symmetrically into the production 
functions, q(z) = q for all z ∈ [0,n].  This implies that the profit of all service providers is given 
by   π(z) = pq − ω(mq + f) = ω(vmq − f) for all z ∈ [0,n], from which each service provider earns 
zero profit if and only if:   
(5)  vmq = f. 
Free entry to (or free exit from) to the local producer services sector ensures that eq.(5) holds in 
equilibrium. 
  Before proceeding, we may set 
(6)  β(s) = 1 for all s ∈ [0,1], 
without any further loss of generality, by choosing the tradeable goods indices.
6  This indexing 
not only simplifies the notation, but also facilitates the interpretation because it implies that a 
country’s share in the world income is equal to the measure of the tradeable goods for which the 
country ends up having comparative advantage in equilibrium. 
 
2.2  Single-Country (or Autarky) Equilibrium (J = 1) 
First, let us look at the equilibrium allocation for J = 1.  This can be viewed as the case of 
a one-country world.  Alternatively, this can also be viewed as the equilibrium allocation of each 
country in autarky, which would serve as the benchmark for evaluating the welfare effects of 
trade in the world economy with multiple countries. 
Because of Cobb-Douglas preferences, all the consumption goods must be consumed by 
positive amounts.  Hence, in the absence of trade, the economy must produce all the 
consumption goods, which means that their prices must be equal to their costs; that is,  
                                                 
6 To see this, starting from any indexing of the goods s' ∈ [0,1] satisfying i)  ) ' ( ~ s γ  is increasing in s' ∈ [0,1], ii) 
) ' (
~
s β > 0 for all s' ∈ [0,1], and iii) 1 ' ) ' (
~ 1
0 = ∫ ds s β , re-index the goods by a monotone increasing transformation, 
∫ ≡ =
'
0 ) ( ) ' (
s
du u s B s β .  Then,  )) ( ( ~ ) (
1 s B s
− ≡γ γ is increasing in s ∈ [0,1], and  ' ) ' ( ) ' ( ds s s dB ds β = = , hence β(s) = 1 
for all s ∈ [0,1]. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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(7)  {} ω ν ζ
θγ γ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
s s n m s s C s P
− + = =    for all s ∈ [0,1] 
Since the representative consumer spends β(s)Y  = Y  on good-s, and sector-s spends 100γ(s)% of 
its revenue on producer services, the total revenue of the producer services sector is 
(8)  npq = n(1+ν)mωq = ∫
1
0
) ( ) ( Yds s s β γ = 
A Γ Y,     
where 
(9)  ∫ ≡ Γ
1
0
) ( ds s
A γ .
7 
Thus, in autarky, the share of the producer services sector in the aggregate income is equal to the 
average share of the producer services across all the consumption goods sector.  (Here, 
superscript A stands either for Autarky or for Average). 
 Likewise,  sector-s spends 100(1−γ(s))% of its revenue on the primary factor.  
Furthermore, each service provider spends ω(f+mq) on the primary factor.  Therefore, the total 
income earned by the (composite) primary factor is equal to: 
(10)  ωV = ∫ −
1
0
) ( )) ( 1 ( Yds s s β γ  + nω(f+mq) = (1−Γ
 A)Y + nω(f+mq); 
Combining (8) and (10) yields  
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to which we insert the free-entry condition (5) to determine the variety of differentiated services 
(and the number of service providers) as well as the aggregate income as follows: 


























Two points about the above equilibrium deserves emphasis.  First, as shown in eq. (11), 
the equilibrium variety of producer services, n
A, is proportional to the share of producer services 
                                                 
7 It might be useful to explain how the re-indexation discussed in the previous footnote works here.  Under a general 
indexing,  ∫ ≡ Γ
1
0 ' ) ' (
~
) ' ( ~ ds s s
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in the total expenditure, which is equal to 
A Γ  in autarky.  Second, free entry ensures zero profit, 
so that the aggregate income of the economy is accrued entirely to the primary factors, as shown 
in eq.(12).  Because all the primary factors, capital (K), labor (L), etc. can be aggregated into a 
single composite, V =F(K,L,…), the equilibrium price of the composite factor is nothing but the 
total factor productivity (TFP) as is commonly measured in the GDP accounting. 
 
2.3  Two-Country Equilibrium (J = 2) 
Let us now turn to the trade equilibrium with two ex-ante identical countries, Home and 
Foreign.  Since they are ex-ante identical, they share the same values for all the exogenous 
parameters.  However, endogenous variables, such as n and ω, might take (and in fact will be 
shown to take) different values, so that asterisks (*) are used to denote Foreign values to 
distinguish them from Home values. 


























which is increasing in s if n < n*; decreasing in s if n > n*; and independent of s if n = n*.  This 
shows the patterns of comparative advantage.  The country with a more developed local support 
industry has comparative advantage in higher-indexed sectors, which rely more heavily on local 
producer services.  However, unlike the standard neoclassical theory of trade, the source of 
comparative advantage is endogenous here because n and n* are endogenous. 
To solve for an equilibrium allocation, suppose n < n* for the moment, hence the graph of 
C(s)/C
*(s) is upward-sloping, as shown in Figure 1.  The height of this graph depends on ω/ω*, 
the relative factor prices.  If ω/ω* were so high to make the graph of C(s)/C
*(s) lie everywhere 
above one, Home would import all the goods from Foreign, while exporting none; this cannot be 
an equilibrium.  Similarly, ω/ω* cannot be so low to make the graph of C(s)/C
*(s) lie 
everywhere below one.  Thus, in equilibrium, Home produces and exports s ∈ [0, S) & Foreign 
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as shown in Figure 1.
8   This means that the equilibrium factor prices can be expressed as 
(13)  1
) (













Thus, due to the productivity effect of more variety (n < n*), the factor price is higher at Foreign 
than at Home (ω < ω*).  
Because of Cobb-Douglas preferences, the total revenue of Home sector-s ∈ [0, S) is 
equal to β(s)(Y+Y
*) = Y+Y
*, of which 100γ(s)%  goes to the Home producer services.  Thus, by 
adding up across all sectors in [0, S), the total revenue of the Home producer services sector is 
























) ( γ , 
is the average share of producer services across all tradeable sectors in [0, S).  Clearly, it is 
increasing in S with 
A Γ = Γ < = Γ
− − ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( γ . 
Likewise, for each s ∈ [0, S), Home sector-s spends 100(1−γ(s))% of its revenue on the 
Home primary factor.  Furthermore, each Home service provider spends ω(f+mq) on the Home 
primary factor.  Therefore, the total income earned by the Home (composite) primary factor is 
equal to: 
(16)  ωV = (1− Γ
–(S))S(Y+Y
*)+ nω(mq +f) 
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to which we insert the free entry condition (5) to obtain: 
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* L K F V Y Y S Y ω ω = = + = . 
                                                 
8 The borderline sector, S, can be produced in either country and its trade flow is indeterminate.  This type of  
indeterminacy is inconsequential, and hence ignored in the following discussion. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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Thus, the equilibrium variety of Home local services is proportional to 
A S Γ < Γ
− ) (;   S represents 
Home’s share in the world income and ω Home’s TFP. 
Likewise, one could follow the same steps for Foreign sector-s ∈(S, 1] to obtain 
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* * * * L K F V Y Y S Y ω ω == = + − = . 
where 











S γ .    
is the average share of producer services across all the tradeable sectors in (S, 1], which is 
increasing in S with  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( γ = Γ < Γ = Γ
+ + A .  In particular, for any S ∈ (0, 1),  
 ) ( ) ( S S
A + − Γ < Γ < Γ , 
which in turn implies, from (11), (17) and (19), n < n
A < n*.   Thus, our initial supposition that n 





































In summary, this demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium, where Home produces and 
exports s ∈ [0, S) and Foreign produces and exports s ∈(S, 1], where S represents the Home 
share in both income and TFP, given by a solution to eq. (23). 
Recall that we began the analysis by supposing n < n* to obtain the above equilibrium.   
By supposing n > n* instead, we can obtain another equilibrium, which is the mirror-image of 
the above equilibrium, where the positions of the two countries are reversed. 
  The intuition behind the existence of such a symmetric pair of asymmetric equilibriums is 
a two-way causality between the patterns of trade and comparative advantage.  A country with a 
more developed local services sector has comparative advantage in tradeable sectors that depend 
more on local services.  And a country with a comparative advantage in those sectors has a more 
developed local services sector.  Since these two equilibriums are the mirror-images of each ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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other; they both predict the same equilibrium distribution of income and of TFP in the world 
economy, summarized by S, a solution to eq. (23).
9 
  Indeed, there is another equilibrium, where n = n* = n
A.  In this symmetric equilibrium, 
which replicates the autarky equilibrium in each country, the unit cost of production of each 
tradeable good is equal across two countries, so that the consumers everywhere is indifferent as 
to which country they purchase tradeable goods from.  In other words, the patterns of trade are 
indeterminate in this case.  If exactly 50% of the world income is spent on each country’s 
tradeable goods sectors, and if these spending is distributed across the two countries in such a 
way that the local services sector of each country ends up receiving exactly  2 /
A Γ  fraction of the 
world spending, then free entry to this sector in each country would lead to n = n* = n
A.  
However, it is easy to see that this equilibrium is fragile in that the required spending patterns 
described above must be exactly met in spite that the consumers are indifferent.  Furthermore, 
this equilibrium is unstable in that a small perturbation that causes n > n* (n < n*) would lead to 
an abrupt change in the spending patterns that makes the profit of Home local service firms rise 
(fall) discontinuously, which leads to a higher (lower) n and the profit of Foreign local service 
firms fall (rise) discontinuously, which leads to a lower (higher) n*.   
The mechanism that causes the instability of the symmetric equilibrium, n = n* = n
A, is 
indeed the same two-way causality that generates the symmetric pair of stable asymmetric 
equilibriums demonstrated above.  Although such a symmetry-breaking mechanism is well-
known in the literature on international trade and economic geography, they are usually 
demonstrated in models of two countries or regions.  One of the advantages of the present model 
is that it can be extended to any finite number of countries. 
 
2.4  Multi-Country Equilibrium (2 < J < ∞) 
Note first that the same logic behind the instability of the symmetric equilibrium in the 
two-country world implies that no two countries share the same value of n in any stable 
equilibrium.   The countries can be thus ranked in such a way that { }
J
j j n
1 = is a monotone 
increasing sequence.  (Here, subscripts indicate the positions of countries in a particular 
                                                 
9 Although I have been unable to find an example, eq.(23) might have multiple solutions for some γ functions.  If 
this is the case, there is a symmetric pair of asymmetric stable equilibriums for each solution to eq. (23).  However, I 
am not concerned about the possibility of this kind of multiplicity, as it can be ruled out for a sufficiently large J, as 
will be seen below. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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equilibrium, not the identity of the country.)   Then, from (4), the relative cost between the j-th 







































is strictly increasing in s for any j = 1, 2, ..., J−1,  for any combination of the factor prices 
{}
J
j j 1 = ω .  In equilibrium, {}
J
j j 1 = ω must adjust such that each country becomes the strictly lowest 
cost producers and hence the exporter for a positive measure of the tradeable goods.  This 
condition implies that a sequence, {}
J
j j S
0 = , defined by  










































   ( j = 1, 2, ..., J−1),  
is monotone increasing.
10   This is illustrated in Figure 2, which also implies that the patterns of 
trade are such that the set of the tradeable goods, [0,1], is partitioned into J intervals of (Sj−1, Sj) 
(j = 1, 2, ..., J), and the j-th country produces and exports s ∈ (Sj−1, Sj).







j j S  can be rewritten to obtain: 
(24)  1
) (




















.   (j = 1, 2, ..., J−1) 
Hence, {}
J
j j 1 = ω is also monotone increasing. 
 Since  the  j-th country specializes in (Sj−1, Sj), 100(Sj−Sj−1)% of the world income, Y
W, is 
spent on its tradeable sectors, and its sector-s in (Sj−1, Sj) spends 100γ(s)% of its revenue on its 
local services.  Thus, the total revenues of its local producer services sector is equal to 

















) ( γ Y
W = (Sj−Sj−1)ГjY
W,     (j = 1, 2, ...,J )   
                                                 
10To see why, Sj ≥ Sj+1 would imply Cj (s) > min{Cj–1(s), Cj+1(s)} for all s ∈ [0,1], hence that the j-th country is not 
the lowest cost producers of any tradeable good, a contradiction. 
11 In addition, S0 is produced and exported by the 1
st country and SJ  by the J-th country.  For Sj (j = 1, 2,…, J−1), it 
could be produced by either j-th or (j+1)-th country, and its patterns of trade are indeterminate.  Again, this type of 
indeterminacy is inconsequential and ignored in the following discussion. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  


















1 γ .   (j = 1, 2, ...,J ) 
is the average share of producer services across all tradeable sectors in (Sj−1, Sj).  Since  ) (• γ is 
increasing, {}
J
j j 1 = Γ is also monotone increasing. 
Likewise, in the j-th country, sector-s ∈ (Sj−1, Sj) spends 100(1−γ(s))% of its revenue on 
its primary factor, and each service provider spends ωj(f+mqj) on its primary factor.  Thus, the 
total income earned by the primary factor in the j-th country is equal to: 
(27)  ωjV = (1− Гj)(Sj−Sj−1)Y
W + njωj(mqj + f)   (j = 1, 2, ...,J ) 
Combining (25) and (27) yields: 



















ω / 1 1



























 ( j = 1, 2, ...,J ) 
to which we insert the free-entry, zero profit condition (5) to yield 
















n j j ) 1 ( ν
ν




j j j j Y S S V Y ) ( 1 − − = =ω .   (j = 1, 2, ...,J ) 
Because {}
J
j j 1 = Γ is monotone increasing, eq.(28) shows that { }
J
j j n
1 = is also monotone increasing, as 
has been assumed.  Eq.(29) shows that  j ω  represents TFP of the j-th poorest country, and 
1 − − ≡ j j j S S s , the measure of the tradeable goods in which this country has comparative 
advantage, is also equal to its share in the world income.  It also implies that  ∑ = =
j
k k j s S
1  
represents the share of the j poorest countries in world income. 
Finally, by combining (24), (28), and (29), we obtain the equation that determines { }
J
j j S
0 =  



































 with  0 0 = S  and  1 = J S .  
To summarize;  ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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0 =  is a solution to the nonlinear 2
nd-order difference equation with the two terminal 
conditions: 



















































1 γ . 
Figure 3 illustrates a solution to eq.(30) graphically by means of the Lorenz curve, 
] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : → Φ
J , defined by the piece-wise linear function, satisfying  j
J S J j = Φ ) / ( .  From this 
Lorenz curve, we can easily recover { }
J
j j s
0 = , the distribution of the country shares in the world 
income and vice versa.
12  A few points deserve emphasis.  First, because  ) , ( 1 j j S S − Γ  is increasing 
in j,  ≡ + j j s s / 1  / ) ( 1 j j S S − + ) ( 1 − − j j S S  is increasing in j. Hence, the Lorenz curve is kinked at J j/ 
for each j = 1, 2, ..., J−1.  In other words, the ranking of the countries is strict.
13  Second, since 
both income and TFP are proportional to  1 − − ≡ j j j S S s , the Lorenz curve here also represents the 
Lorenz curve for income and TFP.  Third, we could also obtain the ranking of countries in other 
variables of interest that are functions of { }
J
j j s
0 = .  For example, the j-th country’s share in world 
trade can be shown to be equal to  ( ) {} ( ) { } ∑ = − −
J
k k k j j s s s s
1
2 2 / , which is increasing in j .  The j-th 
country’s trade dependence, defined by the volume of trade divided by its GDP, can be shown to 
be equal to  j s − 1 , which is decreasing in j. 
  Even though the nonlinear difference equation, eq. (30), fully characterizes the 
equilibrium distribution across countries, it is not analytically solvable.  Of course, one could try 
to solve it numerically.  However, numerical methods are not useful for answering the question 
                                                 
12 This merely states that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the distribution of income and the Lorenz 
curve.  With J ex-ante identical countries, there are J! (factorial) equilibria for each Lorenz curve.  Furthermore, 
there may be multiple solutions to (30), although such multiplicity can be ruled out for a sufficiently large J, as will 
be seen below. 
13 This is in sharp contract to the model of Matsuyama (1996), which generates a non-degenerate distribution of 
income across countries, but with a clustering of countries that share the same level of income.  The crucial 
difference seems that there are more countries than tradeable goods in the model of Matsuyama (1996), while the 
tradeable goods outnumbers the countries in the present model. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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of the uniqueness or for determining how the solution depends on the parameters of the model.  
Instead, in spirit similar to the central limit theorem, let us to approximate the equilibrium 
Lorenz curve by  Φ = Φ ∞ →
J
J lim .  It turns out that, as J Æ ∞, eq.(30) converges to the nonlinear 
2
nd-order differential equation with a unique solution that can be solved analytically.  This allows 
us to study not only the effects of changing the parameters on the Lorenz curve, but also the 
welfare effects of trade. 
 
2.5  Equilibrium Lorenz Curve: Limit Case (J Æ ∞) 
I will now sketch the method to obtain the limit Lorenz curve,  Φ = Φ ∞ →
J
J lim .  Although 
the method is technical in nature, it is worthwhile partly because the method will be used again 
in extensions of the model, and partly because it might be potentially useful for other 
applications in economics.  The basic strategy is to take Taylor expansions on both sides of eq. 
(30).
14   
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j j ∆ + Φ − ∆ Φ = ∆ − Φ − Φ = −
∆
− , 
from which the LHS of eq. (30) can be written as: 



































j j ∆ + ∆ Φ Φ + Φ =






















j j ∆ + ∆ Φ Φ − Φ =







from which the RHS of eq.(30) can be written as: 
                                                 
14 Initially, I obtained the (correct) limit Lorenz curve by a different method, which involves repeated use of the 
mean value theorem.  However, Hiroshi Matano, a mathematician and an expert in this area, pointed out to me that it 
is not rigorous and instead showed me the right method, to which I am grateful.  ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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  () x o x x x ∆ + ∆ Φ Φ + = ) ( ' )) ( ( ' 1 θγ . 
By combining these, eq.(30) becomes: 
() () x o x x x x o x
x
x
∆ + ∆ Φ Φ + = ∆ + ∆
Φ
Φ
+ ) ( ' )) ( ( ' 1
) ( '
) ( "
1 θγ . 
By letting  0 / 1 → = ∆ J x , eq.(30) converges to the following differential equation: 










To solve it, integrate it once to obtain 
() 0 )) ( ( ) ( ' log c x x = Φ − Φ θγ  or    ( )
0 ) ( ' )) ( ( exp
c e x x = Φ Φ −θγ  
where c0 is a constant to be determined.  By integrating the above once again, 







) ( + = ∫
Φ
−θγ , 
where c1 is another constant to be determined.  From the two terminal conditions,  0 ) 0 ( = Φ  and 






− ds e c




) ( 0 ds e e
s c θγ ; 
from which the solution,  ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : → Φ , is determined uniquely by 



















) ( θγ θγ , 
which can be rewritten more compactly as: 
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Proposition 2:  The limit equilibrium Lorenz curve, 
J
J Φ ∞ → lim  = Φ, is characterized by the 
nonlinear 2
nd-order differential equation with the two terminal conditions: ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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θγ  with  0 ) 0 ( = Φ  and  1 ) 1 ( = Φ  
whose unique solution is given by: 





) ( ) (
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Figure 4 illustrates the unique solution, (32).  As shown in the left panel,  ) (s h is positive and 
decreasing in s ∈ [0, 1].  Thus, its integral,  ) (s H x = , is increasing and concave.  Furthermore, 
) (s h is normalized in such a way that  0 ) 0 ( = H  and  1 ) 1 ( = H , as shown in the right panel.  
Hence, its inverse function, the Lorenz curve,  ( ) x H x s
1 ) (
− = Φ =  is increasing, convex, with 
0 ) 0 ( = Φ  and  1 ) 1 ( = Φ . 
With the limit Lorenz curve ( ) x H x s
1 ) (
− = Φ =  in hand, one could easily calculate: 
•  Share of Country at 100x% in World GDP:  dx e ds e dx x
x s )) ( (
1
0









θγ θγ . 
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= Φ = ∫
θγ θγ  












− )) 0 ( 1 (
) 1 (
) 0 (
) 1 ( '
) 0 ( '
) 0 ( '
) 1 ( '
. 
 
Furthermore, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of (normalized) GDPs, y, can be readily 
calculated as  ) ( ) ' ( ) (
1 y y x
− Φ ≡ Ψ = .  The following table illustrates the calculation by using 
power-law (e.g., truncated Pareto) examples. 
 
Table: Power-Law Examples 
  Example 1: 
s s = ) ( γ  
Example 2: 
[ ]θ θ γ
1
) 1 ( 1 log ) ( s e s − + =
 
Example 3: 
[] λ λ γ
1















  [ ]θ θ
1
) 1 ( 1 log s e − +   []
1
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) (s H x =  
Lorenz 
Curve:
) (x s Φ =  
) (
1 x H
− =  
[] θ θ
1
) 1 ( 1 log
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Note that Example 1 and Example 2 may be viewed as the limit cases of Example 3, as  0 → λ  
and  θ λ → , respectively.   As λ  varies from −∞ to +∞, the “power” in the probability density 
function (pdf),  2 / − θ λ , changes from −∞ to +∞.  As λ  → −∞, the use of the local services 
become more concentrated in a narrow range of tradeable sectors, which means that just a small 
fraction of countries specialize in such “desirable” tradeable goods.  Thus, the pdf declines 
sharply in the upper end. 
  Another advantage of the limit Lorenz curve, (32), is that one could easily see the effect 
of changing θ, which is illustrated in Figure 4.   To see this, note first that
) ( ) ( ˆ s e s h
θγ − ≡ , the 
numerator of  ) (s h , satisfies  
0 ) ( '











In words, it is log-submodular in θ and s.
15  Thus, a higher θ shifts the graph of 
) ( ) ( ˆ s e s h
θγ − ≡  
down everywhere but proportionately more at a higher s.   Since ) (s h  is a rescaled version of  
) ( ˆ s h  to keep the area under the graph unchanged, the graph of  ) (s h is rotated “clockwise” by a 
higher θ, as shown in the left panel.  This “single-crossing” in  ) (s h implies that a higher θ makes 
the Lorenz curve more “curved” and move further away from the diagonal line, as shown in the 
                                                 
15See Topkis (1998) for mathematics of super- and sub-modularity and Costinot (2009) for a recent application to 
international trade. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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right panel.  In other words, a higher θ causes a Lorenz-dominant shift of the Lorenz curve.  
Thus, any Lorenz-consistent inequality measure, such as the generalized Kuznets Ratio, the Gini 
index, the coefficients of variations, etc. all agree that a higher θ leads to greater inequality.
16 
 
2.6  Welfare Effects of Trade 
Let us turn to the welfare effects of trade.  The mere fact that international trade creates 
ranking of countries and makes some countries poorer than others, does not necessarily imply 
that trade make them poorer.  We need to compare the utility levels under trade and under 
autarky. 
From eq.(1), the welfare under autarky is 
() ( ) ( ) ds s P V U
A A A ∫ − =
1
0
) ( log log log ω . 
Likewise, the welfare of the country that ends up being the j-th poorest can be written as:  
() ( ) () ds s P V U j j ∫ − =
1
0
) ( log log log ω  
where the tradeable goods prices satisfy  
 















































⎛ =   for s ∈ (Sk−1, Sk) for k = 1, 2, …, J. 
























































































which can be further rewritten as follows:  
Proposition 3 (J-country case): The country that ends up being the j-th poorest under trade 
gains from trade if and only if: 










































1 ) ( log log θ
ω
ω
 > 0. 
Proposition 3 offers a decomposition of the welfare effects of trade.  The first term of eq.(33)  
                                                 
16Likewise, any shift in γ(s) that rotates h(s) clockwise leads to greater inequality. 
  ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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k k Y Y
1
1 / log  
represents the country’s income (as well as TFP) relative to the world average.  This term is 


















1) ( log θ  > 0,  
captures the usual gains from trade (i.e., after controlling for the income and TFP differences 
across countries) and it is always positive.
 17  Aside from a rather obvious statement that a 
country gains from trade if its income (and TFP) ends up being higher than the world average, 
Proposition 3 cannot offer much insight on the overall welfare effects of trade in the absence of 
an explicit solution for eq.(30). 
 As ∞ → J , the task of evaluating the overall welfare effect becomes greatly simplified.  
By setting x* = j/J and x = k/J in eq. (33) and noting that  ) ( ' / *) ( ' / x x k j Φ Φ → ω ω  and 
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s
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γ γ  
To summarize: 
Proposition 4 (Limit case; J Æ ∞): The country that ends up being at 100x* percentile under 
trade gains from trade if and only if: 
                                                 
17To prove it, consider the convex maximization problem: 
{} ( ) ∑ = − − Γ
=
J
k k k k k
c
S S c Max
J
k k
1 1) ( log
1
 s.t.  1 ) (
1 1 ≤ − ∑ = −
J
k k k k S S c .  
Although 1 = k c  satisfies the constraint, its optimum is reached at
A




k k S S
1 1) ( / log  
>  () 0 ) ( 1 log
1 1 = − Γ ∑ = −
J
k k k k S S . ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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γ γ θ > 0, 
where  *) ( * x s Φ =  or  *) ( *
1 s x
− Φ = . 
As in Proposition 3, Proposition 4 offers a decomposition of the welfare effects of trade.  The 
first term,  
A A x s Γ − Φ = Γ − *)) ( ( *) ( γ γ ,  
represents the size of local service sector, which affects TFP of the economy, relative to the 
world average and relative to the autarky.  This term is increasing in  *) ( * x s Φ = , negative at x* 















γ  > 0, 
represents the usual gains from trade (i.e., controlling for the productivity differences across 
countries) and it is always positive.
18  This implies that 
A x s Γ ≥ Φ = *)) ( ( *) ( γ γ  is a sufficient 
condition that a country gains from trade.  In fact, Proposition 4 allows us to say a lot more about 
the overall welfare effects of trade, which are given in the following two Corollaries.  
Corollary 1: All countries gain from trade if and only if  




























The following example shows that Corollary 1 is not vacuous. 
Example 4: 
η γ s s = ) (,   η > 0.  Since  0 ) 0 ( = γ , (35) can be rewritten as 
() () ∫ Γ Γ
1
0
/ ) ( log / ) ( ds s s
A A γ γ  =  1 ) 1 /( ) 1 log( > + − + η η η , which holds for a sufficiently large η. 
Quite remarkably, the sufficient and necessary condition under which all countries gain from 
trade, (35), depends solely on γ(•).  In particular, it is independent of θ, which only plays a role 
of magnifying the gains and losses from trade.   
                                                 
18To prove it, consider the convex maximization problem;  ∫ ∈
1
0 ] 1 , 0 [ ); (
)) ( log( ) ( ds s c s Max
s s c
γ  subject to  1 ) (
1
0 ≤ ∫ ds s c .  
Although 1 ) ( = s c  satisfies the constraint, its optimum is reached at
A s s c Γ = / ) ( ) ( γ , hence > Γ ∫
1
0 ) / ) ( log( ) ( ds s s
A γ γ  
0 ) 1 log( ) (
1
0 = ∫ ds s γ . ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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Corollary 2: Suppose that (35) fails.  Then, there exists  c s  > 0, defined by  
































a):  All countries producing and exporting goods s ∈ [0, sc) lose from trade, while all countries 
producing and exporting goods s ∈ (sc, 1] gain from trade. 
b):  The fraction of the countries that lose from trade,  c x , is given by  ) ; ( θ c c x s Φ = , or 
equivalently, ) ; ( θ c c s H x =  >  c s  > 0.  This is increasing in θ and  c c c s s H x = =
→ → ) ; ( lim lim
0 0 θ
θ θ ;  
1 ) ; ( lim lim = =
∞ → ∞ → θ
θ θ c c s H x . 
Note that c s  depends solely on γ(•) and is independent of θ.  However,  c x  is increasing in θ. 
Corollary 2b states that, as θ increases from 0 to ∞ (i.e., as σ declines from ∞ to 1), it increases 
from  c s  to 1.  In other words, with a γ function that satisfies the condition under which some 
countries lose from trade, almost all countries can lose from trade as σ Æ 1.   
Example 5;  Let  s s = ) ( γ .  Then,  ( )




⎛ + − ∫
1
0 2 log 2 / 1 * ds s s s θ , from which 













) (,  
so that less than one half of the world gains from trade at θ = 0.8; less than one third at θ = 2.3; 
less than one fourth at θ = 3.2; less than one fifth at θ = 3.8, less than one tenth at θ = 5.8, and so 
on. 
 
3. Two  Extensions 
The above model can be generalized in many directions.  This section offers two 
extensions.  The first allows a fraction of the consumption goods within each sector to be 
nontradeable.  By reducing the fraction, this extension enables us to examine how inequality 
across countries is affected by globalization through trade in goods.  The second allows variable 
supply in one of the components in the composite of primary factors, either through factor 
accumulation or factor mobility.  By changing the share of the variable primary factor in the 
composite, this extension enables us to examine how inequality across countries is affected by ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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technological change that increases importance of human capital or by globalization through 
trade in factors. 
 
3.1  Nontradeable Consumption Goods: Globalization through Trade in Goods 
 
In the above model, all consumption goods are assumed to be tradeable.  Assume now that each 
sector-s produces many varieties, a fraction τ of which is tradeable and a fraction 1−τ is 
nontradeable, and that they are aggregated by Cobb-Douglas preferences.
19  The expenditure 
function is now obtained by replacing  )) ( log( s P  with  )) ( log( ) 1 ( )) ( log( s P s P N T τ τ − +  for each s 
∈ [0,1], where  ))} ( { ) ( s C Min s P j T =  is the price of  each tradeable good in sector-s, common 
across all countries, ) ( ) ( s C s P j N =  is the price of each nontradeable good in sector-s, which is 
equal to the unit of cost of production in each country. 
  Instead of going through the entire derivation of the equilibrium, only the key steps will 
be highlighted below.  Again, let {}
J
j j n
1 = be a monotone increasing sequence.  As before, the 
patterns of trade and the free entry condition lead to   
(24)  1
) (




















.  (j = 1, 2, ..., J−1) 
(29) 
W
j j j j Y S S V Y ) ( 1 − − = =ω .   (j = 1, 2, ...,J ) 
However, the equilibrium variety of the local service sector is now given by, instead of (28): 






















τ τ . 
Combining these equations yields 
Proposition 5 (J-country case): Let ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : → Φ
J  denote the Lorenz curve in GDP and TFP, 
the piece-wise linear function satisfying j
J S J j = Φ ) / ( .  Then, { }
J
j j S
0 =  solves the following 
                                                 
19 This specification assumes that the share of local differentiated producer services in sector-s is γ(s) for both 
nontradeables and tradeables.  This assumption is made because, when examining the effect of globalization by 
changing τ, we do not want the distribution of γ across all tradeable consumption goods to change.  However, for 
some other purposes, it would be useful to consider the case where the distribution of γ among nontradeable 
consumption goods differ systematically from those among tradeable consumption goods.  For example, Matsuyama 
(1996) allows for such possibility to generate a positive correlation between income and the nontradeable 
consumption goods prices across countries, similar to Balassa and Samuelson. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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nonlinear 2
nd-order difference equation with the two terminal conditions: 
                1
) 1 ( ) , (













Γ − + Γ







































1 γ . 
This equilibrium converges to a collection of J identical single-country (autarky) equilibria as τ 
Æ 0 and to the J-country trade equilibrium shown in Proposition 1, as τ Æ 1.  
By following the same steps shown in section 2.5, one could obtain 
Proposition 6 (Limit Case; ∞ → J ): The limit equilibrium Lorenz curve in GDP and TFP, 
J
J Φ ∞ → lim  = Φ, is characterized by the following nonlinear 2
nd-order differential equation with 
the two terminal conditions: 
             () ) ( / 1














 with  0 ) 0 ( = Φ  &  1 ) 1 ( = Φ  
whose unique solution is: 





) ; ( ); (
x
ds g s h g x H x ,  where 
()















/ ) ( 1
/ ) ( 1
) ; (














where  ) 1 /( τ τ − ≡ g  > 0. 
Again, Figure 4 illustrates the solution.  For each  ) 1 /( τ τ − ≡ g  > 0,  ) ; ( g s h  is positive, and 
decreasing in s , and it is normalized so that its integral from 0 to 1 is equal to 1.  Thus,  ) ; ( g s H  
is increasing and concave in s , with  0 ) ; 0 ( = g H  and  1 ) ; 1 ( = g H .  Hence,  ( ) g x H g x ; ) ; (
1 − = Φ  is 
increasing and convex in x, with  0 ) ; 0 ( = Φ g  and  1 ) ; 1 ( = Φ g .  It is also easy to check  
1 ) ; ( lim ) ; ( lim
0 0 = =
→ → g s h g s h
g τ .   
Thus, as τ Æ 0, each country converges to the same single-country (autarky) equilibrium and 









1 ) ( ) ; ( lim ) ; ( lim
du e
e






Thus, as τ Æ 1, the Lorenz curve converges to the one shown in Proposition 2. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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  Indeed, a higher τ , as well as a higher θ, causes a Lorenz-dominant shift, as illustrated by 
the arrows in Figure 4.  To see this, one just need to check that the numerator of  ) ; ( g s h , 
()
θ
γ γ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ Γ + ≡
− Γ ) ( /
/ ) ( 1 ) ; ( ˆ s g A e s g g s h
A
, is log-submodular in g and s (and in θ and s).  This means 
that both a higher τ  (and a higher θ) makes the graph of  ) ; ( g s h rotate “clockwise,” as shown in 
the left panel, which in turn implies that the Lorenz curve becomes more “curved” and moves 
away from the diagonal line, as shown in the right panel.  This result thus suggests that 
globalization through trade in goods leads to greater inequality across countries. 
 
3.2  Variable Factor Supply: Effects of Factor Mobility and/or Factor Accumulation 
  Returning to the case where τ  = 1,  this subsection instead allows the available amount of  
the composite primary factors, V,  to vary across countries by endogenizing the supply of one of 
the component factors, K, as follows: 
(37)  Vj = F(Kj,L)   with   ωjFK(Kj, L) = ρ. 
where FK(Kj, L) is the first derivative of F with respect to K, satisfying FKK.  In words, the supply 
of K in the j-th country responds to its TFP, ωj, such that its factor price is equalized across 
countries at a common value, ρ.  This can be justified in two different ways. 
A. Factor Mobility: Imagine that L represents (a composite of) factors that are immobile across 
borders and K represents (a composite of) factors that are freely mobile across borders, which 
seek higher return until its return is equalized in equilibrium.
20  According to this interpretation, 
ρ is an equilibrium rate of return determined endogenously, although it is not necessary to solve 
for it when deriving the Lorenz curve.
21 
B. Factor Accumulation: Reinterpret the structure of the economy as follows.  Time is 
continuous.  All the tradeable goods, s ∈ [0,1], are intermediate inputs that goes into the 
                                                 
20Which factors should be considered as mobile or immobile depends on the context.  If “countries” are interpreted 
as “metropolitan areas,” K may include not only capital but also labor, with L representing the immobile “land.”  
Although labor is commonly included as immobile factors in the trade literature, we will later consider the 
possibility of trade in factors, in which case certain types of labor should be included among mobile factors. 
21Also, Yj = Vj = ωjF(Kj, L) should be now interpreted as GDP of the economy, not GNP, and Kj is the amount of K 
used in the j-th country, not the amount of K owned by the representative agent in the j-th country. This also means 
that the LHS of the budget constraint in the j-th country should be its GNP, not its GDP (Yj).  However, calculating 
the distributions of GDP (Yj), TFP (ωj), and Kj/L does not require to use the budget constraint for each country, 
given that all consumption goods are tradeable (τ = 1).  The analysis would be more involved if τ < 1. ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
  - 26 -





0 )) ( log( exp ds s X Y t t   





0 )) ( log( exp ds s P t .  The representative agent in each country consumes 
and invests the final good to accumulate Kt, so as to maximize ∫
∞ −
0 ) ( dt e C u
t
t
ρ  s.t. 
•
+ = t t t K C Y , 
where ρ is the subjective discount rate common across countries. Then, the steady state rate of 
return on K is equalized at ρ.
 22  According to this interpretation, K may include not only physical 
capital but also human capital, and the Lorenz curve derived below represents steady state 
inequality across countries. 
  Again, only the key steps will be shown.  Let { }
J
j j n
1 = be monotone increasing.  As before,  
{}
J
j j 1 = ω adjust to ensure that there exists a monotone increasing sequence, { }
J
j j S
1 = , defined by S0 = 











































































which implies that {}
J
j j 1 = ω , {}
J
j j K
1 = , and { }
J
j j V
1 =  are all monotone increasing in j.   
For the j-th country which produces s ∈ (Sj−1, Sj), the factor market conditions can be 
combined to derive: 
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Hence, the free entry condition implies 
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22The intertemporal resource constraint assumes that K is not mobile but also international lending and borrowing is 
not possible.  Of course, these restrictions are not binding in steady state, because the rate of return is equalized at ρ ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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To see what is involved, suppose V = F(K, L) = AK
αL




















































































Proposition 7 (J-country case): Let ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : → Φ
J  denote the Lorenz curve in Y and in K/L, 
the piece-wise linear function satisfying j
J S J j = Φ ) / ( .  Then, { }
J
j j S
0 =  solves the following 
nonlinear 2
nd-order difference equation with the two terminal conditions: 
                         1
) , (
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1 γ . 
It should be emphasized that  ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : → Φ
J  represents the Lorenz curve in Y and in K/L, not in 
TFP.  However, the distribution of TFP can be obtained from the distribution of Y (or K/L), using 





1 1 / / j j j j Y Y . 
Following the same steps shown in section 2.5, 
Proposition 8 (Limit Case; J Æ ∞): The limit equilibrium Lorenz curve, 
J
J Φ ∞ → lim  = Φ, in Y 
and in K/L,  is characterized by the following nonlinear 2
nd-order differential equation with the 
two terminal conditions: 
)) ( ( 1













θγ  with  0 ) 0 ( = Φ  &  1 ) 1 ( = Φ  
whose unique solution is given by: ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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Again, Figure 4 illustrates the unique solution.  For each α  <  σ / 1 1−  =  ) 1 /( 1 θ + ,  ) ; ( α s h  is 
positive, and decreasing in s , and it is normalized so that its integral from 0 to 1 is equal to 1.  
Thus,  ) ; ( α s H  is increasing and concave in s , with  0 ) ; 0 ( = α H  and  1 ) ; 1 ( = α H .  Hence, 
() α α ; ) ; (
1 x H x
− = Φ  is increasing and convex in x, with  0 ) ; 0 ( = Φ α  and  1 ) ; 1 ( = Φ α .  It is also 

















α α . 
Thus, as α Æ 0, the solution converges to the Lorenz curve shown in Proposition 2. 
  Indeed, a higher α , as well as a higher θ, causes a Lorenz-dominant shift, as illustrated by 
















− ≡ s s h , 
is log-submodular in α and s (and in θ and s).  Thus, a higher α (and a higher θ) makes the graph 
of ) ; ( α s h rotate “clockwise,” as shown in the left panel, which in turn implies that the Lorenz 
curve becomes more “curved” and moves away from the diagonal line, as shown in the right 
panel.  This result suggests that skill-biased technological change that increases the share of 
human capital and reduces the share of raw labor in production, or globalization through trade in 
some factors, both of which can be interpreted as an increase in α, could lead to greater 
inequality across countries. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
  In cross-section of countries, the rich tend to have higher TFPs and higher capital-labor 
ratios. Such empirical findings are typically interpreted as the causality from TFPs and/or 
capital-labor ratios to income under two maintained hypotheses; i) these countries offer 
independent observations and ii) any variations in endogenous variables across countries would 
disappear in the absence of any exogenous sources of variations across countries.  The model ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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presented above offers some cautions for such an interpretation of cross-country variations.  
Despite that countries are ex-ante identical, the model predicts that a strict ranking of countries in 
income, TFPs, and capital-labor ratios (and other endogenous variables) emerge endogenously, 
and these variables are all jointly determined, and (perfectly) correlated across countries.  This 
occurs because the countries end up sorting themselves into specializing in different sets of 
countries.  In other words, some countries become richer (poorer) than others partly because they 
trade with poorer (richer) countries, so these countries do not offer independent observations.  Of 
course, there have been other studies that deliver a similar message.  In contrast to such earlier 
studies, which all used a highly stylized framework, the model here has advantage that it allows 
for any finite number of countries and offers a full characterization of the equilibrium Lorenz 
curve across countries with quantitative implications in an analytically tractable manner.©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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Figure 1: Comparative Advantage and Patterns of Trade in the Two-Country World 
S j−1 
s   
1 
Cj−1(s)/Cj(s)  Cj(s)/Cj+1(s) 
Sj 
sj 
1  O 
Figure 2: Comparative Advantage and Patterns of Trade in the J-country World ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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Figure 4: Limit Equilibrium Lorenz Curve, Φ(x), and its Lorenz-dominant Shift 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Lorenz curve, Φ
J: A Graphic Illustration for J = 4 ©Kiminori Matsuyama, Endogenous Ranking and Equilibrium Lorenz Curve  
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